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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDffiES
Sanford Levinson*
Amendment XII: The person having the greatest number of
votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a
majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no
person have such majority, then from the persons having the
highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted
for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose
immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote .... ; and a majority of all
the states shall be necessary to a choice. . . . The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be
the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole
number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate
shall choose the Vice-President....
Amendment XX: The terms of the President and Vice-President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January....

On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan decisively defeated
Jimmy Carter, the incumbent President (who had himself defeated an incumbent President four years before). Perhaps more
to the point, in the 1980 election the electorate "repudiated"
much of the legacy of the Democratic Party and declared its preference for leadership in a significantly different direction.! Ronald Reagan did not, however, take office until January 20, 1981.
On November 8, 1992, the incumbent, George Bush, garnered
less than 40% of the popular vote; Bill Clinton was elected with
43% of the popular vote, while Ross Perot got 19%. Again, a
desire for "change" was widely viewed as one of the meanings of
• W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Regents Chair in Law, The
University of Texas Law School.
1. I borrow the tenn "repudiation" from Stephen Skowronek's important book
The Politics Presidents Make: Lel.ldership from John Adams to George Bush 36 (Belknap
Press, 1993).
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the election. Clinton, of course, did not take office until January
20, 1992.
On November 5, 1996, almost anything is thinkable, given
the current state of American politics: Perhaps Phil Gramm will
indeed be elected on a platform of full-scale destruction of what
will still remain of the 20th-century regulatory- and welfare-state.
He would, presumably, have to wait until January 20, 1997, to
begin the final dismantling. Or perhaps disaffected Democrats
on the left and either pro- or anti-choice Republicans will choose
to bolt from their respective parties and run insurgent candidacies that capture enough of the electoral vote to throw the election into the Congress. Any result other than Bill Clinton's reelection will highlight what I deem the most mischievious feature(s) of the current Constitution.
Consider first the easier (and far more common) case-the
defeat of a sitting President followed by a ten-week hiatus in
which the repudiated incumbent continues to possess the full
legal powers of the modern American presidency, including, as
illustrated by the Bush interregnum, the power to send troops
abroad (to Somalia) and to pardon criminals (Elliot Abrams) or
possible collaborators in arguably illegal conduct (e.g., Caspar
Weinberger).
This is not, in fact, constitutionally required: It is the result
of the contingency that we vote for presidential electors on the
first Thesday after the first Monday, thanks to Congress's exercise of its authority, given by Article II, § 1, cl. 4, to set a nationally uniform election day.z So, as a technical matter, my
concerns about the gap between election and inauguration do not
require changing our Constitution at all; Congress need only set
the election on, say, the first Sunday following the New Year in
January, with the electors to meet the following Wednesday3 and
Congress in tum to receive the electoral-vote count on the next
Monday. Inauguration could then occur unproblematically on
January 20, unless, of course, no candidate had received a majority of electoral votes (to which I shall return presently).
What is wrong with the present way of doing things? First,
there is something profoundly troubling, to a democrat, in allowing repudiated Presidents to continue to exercise the perogatives of what is usually called the "most powerful political office
2. 3 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1985) (codifying 62 Stat. 672, June 25, 1948).
3. It should be clear that I am not discussing the merits of the electoral college as
such.
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in the world."4 But theoretical troublesomeness is scarcely the
worst consequence. The response to the Great Depression was
scarcely helped by the open discord between Herbert Hoover
and Franklin Roosevelt between November, 1932 and the thenInauguration Day of March 4, 1933. Indeed, one motive for the
20th Amendment was precisely to overcome this four-month hiatus and its perceived disadvantages. Those who framed the 20th
Amendment were on to something important; they simply didn't
go far enough. The best test of this proposition is a simple question: Would anyone reading this essay seriously recommend to
any foreign country that it adopt an election-inauguration structure like our own ?5
The consequences go beyond the mischief that can be done
by a tired, perhaps bitter, repudiated incumbent. Our current
structure directly contributes to the pernicious practice of candidates feeling no need whatsoever to identify anyone who would
occupy high positions in their administrations. Were there only,
say, 10 days between election and inauguration, a candidate
would have to identify such occupants, and voters would therefore have a far greater sense of what sort of administration they
were actually likely to get. My colleague Scot Powe chides me
for believing that voters care about the future Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Fair enough, but do no voters care
about the likely identity of the Secretaries of State and Defense
and the Attorney General (for starters)? Are we content to keep
reposing blind faith in elected quasi-kings (or, in the future,
queens) to choose "the best and the brightest" to exercise power
over our national destiny and personal security?
But maybe we need the extra time so that Congress can
choose the President and Vice-President when no candidate gets
a majority of the electoral votes. If so, would any sane person
choose, in 1995, the system bequeathed us by the framers? Why
in the world should the House of Representatives vote by state
4. The same might be said, incidentally, in regard to "lame-duck" or, even worse,
out-and-out defeated members of Congress. Any true democrat should, at the very least,
be troubled by the ratification of GAIT by the lame-duck Congress in December 1994
instead of the newly elected Republican Congress that, for better or worse, represented
an even sharper repudiation of the prior Democratic majority than did Ointon's election
of the Bush Administration. It is not clear to me why the country benefits from the eightweek gap between legislative elections and installation in office, but that is the subject for
another essay.
5. This question assumes that the country has in fact chosen to have a strong President elected separately from its legislature. As Mark Thshnet notes, almost no other
countries have in fact opted for our distinctive political structure, and several of the contributors to this Symposium suggest that it might be we, rather than they, who have made
the fundamental mistake.

186

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 12:183

instead of by member? Even if one rejects Suzanna Sherry's and
Bill Eskridge's denunciations of the Senate's malapportionment,
it seems inexplicable that anyone would accept, let alone glory in,
the possibility that a majority of state delegations in the House of
Representatives, representing far less than a majority of the national population, would inflict their choice upon the rest of the
country. And even if one can explain why the Senate gets to
choose the Vice President, why restrict the list to two, unless we
simply want to assure that there will be a Vice President, who can
thereupon assume the office of the Presidency should the House
continue to be deadlocked among the three candidates from
whom it picks?
In any event, I believe that only the most blind ancestor
worship can generate any affection at all for our present scheme
of electing and then installing in office our Chief Executive. We
now regularly live with the mischief of the election-inauguration
gap; it is at least thinkable that we will experience the full meaning of the Twelfth Amendment in January of 1997. The Constitution is broke; we should fix it.

